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• 
For Finns, the sixth of December is a day to celebrate. Along with the frolicking, 
frivolities, and the fireworks, the beer and vodka flow, celebrating the most magnificent event 
in Finnish history. On that day in the monumental year of 1917, Czarist Russia, fat from 
hundreds of years of imperialist expansion but reeling from military defeat and internal chaos, 
witnessed one comer of its crumbling empire do the unthinkable-- declare independence. 
Although it was widely known that under the nominal rule of the Czar, the Finns had quite a 
bit of independence both economically and politically, it had been some 600 years since they 
had enjoyed complete freedom from any form of foreign domination. So at the end of the 
month, political chaos at home forced a beleaguered Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to sign the 
document that guaranteed the sovereignty of the newly formed Republic of Finland. 
But it was nearly twenty years later that the rosy story of the birth of modem-day 
Finland took a tum for the worse. Finland was to face a major international crisis that 
threatened not only the sovereignty of the Republic as a whole but the general welfare of its 
entire peace-loving population as well. The new Russia, now Red and far more threatening, 
coveted the pivotal piece of property that once belonged to their predecessor, and they were 
willing to go to great lengths to reacquire it. The Winter War was the culmination of this 
international crisis; a terrifying conflict that laced the snows of Karelia with the blood of 
hundreds of thousands of innocents. It was a deplorable act brought upon by the naivete and 
arrogance of both sides involved and, in the context of the international situation of the time, 
unique in character. However, even though the origins of the Winter War seem easily 
understood, a thorough examination of the years prior to the outbreak of hostilities reveals 
some startling information. Obvious political misunderstandings among the circle of Finnish 
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leaders were, in effect, just as massive an impetus for the Russo-Finnish conflict as Soviet 
expansionist foreign policy. 
The first official document that established relations between the newly independent 
Finland and the Soviet Union was the Treaty of Dorpat signed on November 14, 1920. Here 
the new Russia recognized the self-determination of Finland and disavowed any territorial 
demands. On the Finnish side, considerable concessions appeased the fledgling Soviet 
government's quest for border security. 1 Although in the eyes of the Finns, the treaty 
established all necessary prerequisites for normal relations between the neighbors, it was 
apparent that the conditions stipulated by the treaty were due to the relative weakness of the 
Soviet Union. The Kremlin was practically forced to agree to the maintenance of the Finnish 
border only fifteen miles from its second largest city. However, the Finns argued that the 
border was not only hundreds of years 01d,2 but it was this same border that existed between 
the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Russian Empire from the 19th century up until the 
Revolution. 
Though it is certain that the Soviet Union was not pleased with the content of the 
Dorpat Treaty, it was in no position to argue. At this stage in the new Russia's development, 
it was imperative to emphasize the peaceful nature of their policies, foreign suspicions must 
be quelled before serious internal development could begin. Non-aggression pacts flowed 
forth from the foreign ministry from the late twenties to the early thirties. Finland signed 
such a treaty with Russia in January of 1931, and in 1934 this pact was extended for a further 
IFinland agreed not to fortify the islands dotting the Gulf, nor to maintain any fort or 
battery within fifteen miles of the coast. Petsamo was to be demobilized entirely. 
2The western frontier on the Karelian Isthmus dates back to the Peace of Pahkinsaari of 
1323 and the Peace of Tayssine of 1595 between Sweden and Russia. 
ten years. The two neighbors signed a Convention of Conciliation as well in 1932, 
supplemented by a treaty defining the term 'aggressor' in 1933.3 
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The next year marked the entry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the 
League of Nations. Apparently, the growing menace of a violent Germany eased the 
apprehensive attitude of the Soviet Government into cooperation with the capitalist west. 
Germany had left the League in 1933 and bluntly displayed an open hostility towards 
Communist Russia. To counter this, the Russians implemented a policy of "collective 
security," believing that "... with the firm will and close cooperation of all its members a 
great deal could be done at any given moment for the utmost diminution of the danger of 
war."4 The situation deteriorated further with Hitler's courtship of Poland that same year. To 
counter this threat, the Soviets signed mutual assistance treaties with France and 
Czechoslovakia in 1935. Litvinov's collective security policy depended upon cooperation 
within the League of Nations, but, after the League failed to stamp out the aggressions in 
Manchuria and Ethiopia, it was clear that its credibility had plummeted. 
For Finland, the onerous task of defining itself in the international political arena 
dominated Finnish foreign policy concerns in the twenties and thirties. Since Finland was a 
child of the Versailles generation, the League of Nations was her Godparent. But once the 
League began to show its inherent weaknesses, most smaller states gravitated to larger states 
in search of the insurance of existence. Finland and her Scandinavian brothers, however, 
were the exception; they desired a complete separation form the bantering of the big boys on 
3Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Documents Concerning Finnsh-Soviet Relations, 
22-23. (Hereafter referred to as the Blue Book.) 
4Maxim Litvinov, "Speech on the Occasion of Soviet Entry into the League of Nations" 
Alvin Rubenstein, ed. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. New York: Doubleday, 1960. 
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the block. Neutrality, in the eyes of the Finns, was the catch phrase for their future. To 
achieve this end, in 1935 the Scandinavian bloc emerged, and on December 5th of that year 
Premier Kivimaki outlined the purpose of this new northern coalition in a speech to the 
Finnish Parliament. It was the intention of the Finnish government to establish neutrality in 
conjunction with the other Scandinavian states, a policy which was generally recognized as a 
constant in European affairs. s But little did the Finns or Russians know that just three months 
later the world would witness the first direct challenge to the policy of collective security. 
On March 3, 1936, Germany threw down the gauntlet and marched into the Rhineland. 
The League of Nations watched the western powers vacillate and allow a rearmed and 
chanting Germany to reclaim the bit of ground which was ultimately to change the balance of 
power in Europe. Behind the doubly red brick walls of the Kremlin, Stalin and his 
henchmen understood quite well what this meant. Once the Rhineland was fortified, France 
could not be expected to come to the aid of its eastern allies. Hitler's verbal attacks on the 
Soviet Union grew in intensity, and with the Spanish Civil war raging and the Anti-
Comintern Pact a matter of public knowledge, the gap between Russia and Germany seemed 
impossible to bridge.6 It becomes obvious, then, why the Soviet Union began to question the 
allegiance of its neighbors. 
Finland's declaration of neutrality was not enough to allay the fears of a paranoid 
Soviet Union. It would be disastrous for Russia if indeed the Baltic states and Finland were 
to come under the influence of Germany. The development of cultural and commercial 
Slohn Wuorinen, Finland and World War Two. (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 57 
6Adolph Hitler, My New Order ed. by Raoul de Roussy Sales, (New York: Doubleday, 
1941), 386-447 
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relations between Finland and Germany was suspiciously viewed as a veil hiding possible 
military cooperation. And who in the Soviet government could forget Germany's interference 
in Finland's civil war of 1918, when 12,000 German troops landed in Helsinki to ensure the 
victory of the whites? These fears surfaced as early as 1936, when the Commissar for 
Leningrad, Andrei Zhdanov, gave a speech at the All-Union congress of Soviets: 
We people of Leningrad sit at our windows looking out at the world. Right 
around us lie small countries who... permit great adventurers to scheme within their 
border... if they are not satisfied to mind only their own business, we may feel forced 
to ... call upon the Red Army to defend our country.7 
Here, the Soviets had to make one of the many drastic changes in foreign policy that dotted 
the decade with chaos. In accordance with the growing strength of the communist regime, the 
powerlessness of the League of Nations, and the current international turmoil, the position of 
Russia's neighbors was to be drastically altered. 
In an attempt to alleviate Russian fears, in April of 1935 the Prime Minister of Finland 
denied any hostile designs on the Soviet Union, while making it clear that Finland would not 
jeopardize her neutral position by signing any sort of mutual assistance pact with the USSR. 
He even repeated himself in July,8 but to no avail, for in August, the Soviet press alleged that 
recent plans for the development of commercial airfields in Finland were actually military 
installations destined to base German warplanes.9 Prime Minister Kallio responded the next 
month by declaring that Finland was not interested in the Anti-Comintern Pact in any way.1O 
7Pravda March 1936, 3 
8Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia. (New York, Harcourt and Brace, 
1955), Vol. 2, 81-82. 
9Izvestia, August 1938, 4 
lOBeloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 81 
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But of all of the attempts to calm the concerns of the Soviet Union, previous efforts 
paled in comparison to what took place in 1937. Prime Minister Kallio, a member of the 
liberal Agrarian party, defeated the long-time conservative, pro-German incumbent 
Svinhufvud in the presidential elections on February 15th. This, coupled with Foreign 
Minister Holsti's visit to Moscow earlier that month, signalled to the Soviets that the time was 
ripe to improve relations. 
Immediately following the election, Holsti issued a press release revealing the political 
purpose of his recent Moscow venture: 
I wanted to dispel the anxieties felt in Moscow that Finland might have made 
secret arrangements with a great power whereby Finland should be the jumping-off 
ground for an attack on the Soviet Union. No such arrangement exists, and the 
Finnish Government had no plans for warlike adventures of any kind. II 
Unfortunately for the Finns, the European situation continued to deteriorate. In the spring of 
1938, Hitler annexed Austria, outflanking Czechoslovakia. Poland served an ultimatum on 
Lithuania, and to the north, Russia shared a lengthy border that came not fifteen miles from 
Leningrad with a neighbor whose political friendliness was questionable at best. It was time 
for the Soviet Union to act. 
One intriguing phone call started it all. The entire diplomatic process that led to the 
Winter War began on the morning of April 14, 1938, when a young Soviet diplomat, Boris 
Yartsev, telephoned Finland's Foreign Minister, Rudolf Holsti. Mr. Yartsev asked to see the 
Minister privately, for he had just received an urgent message from Moscow and wished to 
deliver it personally. Even though it was contrary to diplomatic protocol for a junior official 
to directly approach the Minister, Holsti agreed to see him immediately, for he knew very 
llArnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1936, (Stanford University Press, 
1937), 356 
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well that Boris Yartsev was no ordinary juniQf official. In fact, he seemed to move and talk 
with great ease and much more freedom than any of his colleagues, including even the Soviet 
Minister to Finland. Vii-ina Tanner, then Minister for Economics, described him as 
... a lively individual, pleasant in a way. One could easily discuss with him 
even the most delicate matters, as though he were a man who did not have to be 
particularly careful of what he said, unlike many people in his position.12 
Yartsev's glib tongue led to rumors, most likely true, of a possible connection to the Gpu. 13 
Indeed, there was no reason for Holsti to regret waiving the usual formalities. On 
meeting the Foreign Minister, Yartsev announced that he had received "exceptionally broad 
authority"14 to discuss certain delicate matters of extreme importance to the Soviet Union, as 
long as the discussions remained entirely secret. Holsti agreed to secrecy, and asked Yartsev 
to be candid. Yartsev began. 
The Government of the Soviet Union was convinced that Hitler was mustering his 
forces for an eventual assault on the USSR, he said, and Finland played a major role in his 
plans as a base for northern aggression. Finland's attitude toward German designs then came 
into question. If German forces were to operate freely on Finnish soil in preparation for an 
attack in Karelia and Leningrad, then "the Red army would not remain on the border to await 
the enemy, but would advance as far as possible to meet him." 15 Finland would therefore 
become a battleground for the two Great Powers. However, if Finland was prepared to resist 
12 Vii-ina Tanner, The Winter War (Stanford University Press, 1957), 3 
13Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, or State Political Administration, a forrunner 
of the KGB. It was common practice in Soviet embassies to have at least one GPU 
representative on the payroll. 
14Tanner The Winter War, 4 
15 Jakobson, Max. The Diplomacy of the Winter War. (Cambridge, 1961), 8 
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the German assault, the Soviet Union would offer her all possible military and economic 
assistance, vowing to withdraw all forces from Finnish territory after the cessation of 
hostilities. According to Yartsev, if Finland truly wished to avoid falling into German hands, 
acceptance of such assistance was essential. Otherwise, she would find German pressure 
irresistible, for it was known in Moscow, he claimed, that Fascist circles were poised to 
overthrow the Finnish government if it did not bend to Germany's will. 
An astonished, confident Holsti assured Yartsev that Finland's adherence to 
Scandinavian neutrality bloc was solid proof of her status in world affairs. As well, the 
current government enjoyed wide popular support; a full three quarters of the parliament 
professed loyalty to Kallio's administration. Finland just wasn't in as much peril as 
Yartsev claimed. 
But that wasn't enough for the Russian. His government needed "guarantees" that 
Finland would not aid Germany against Russia. "What do you mean by guarantees?" 
Holsti asked. But Yartsev quavered; he was either unwilling or unable to answer. He said 
that further negotiations would determine the nature of the guarantees. 16 
Throughout the summer, while Holsti was away at the League of Nations, Yartsev 
spoke to several other cabinet members. First approached was the Prime Minister, A. K. 
Cajander, who at first did not give the conversation the attention it deserved. Following 
this and other fruitless clandestine discussions, Mr. Cajander deferred to Vaino Tanner, a 
member of the foreign affairs committee of the Cabinet. Mr. Tanner and Mr. Yartsev met 
16Jakobson The Diplomacy of the Winter War, 9. Here Jakobson quotes a heretofore 
unpublished document, a report of a committee set up to study Finnish foreign policy from 
1938-1944. 
for the first time on July 30, 1938, but they were also unable to reach any concrete 
agreements. Frustrated, Tanner turned to his superior, A. K. Cajander, who jotted down a 
note for Yartsev, even though the same points in the note had been expressed several times 
before: 
While always adhering to the neutral policy of the northern countries, the 
Finnish government will at the same time permit no violation of Finnish territorial 
integrity nor consequently the acquisition by any great power of a foothold in 
Finland for an attack against the Soviet Union.... 17 
Mr. Yartsev read the reply on August 11, and one week later approached Tanner with 
something that for the first time defined more precisely what Moscow was looking for. 
But, even though in writing, it was still as hazy as a Leningrad morning. In rough German 
(Tanner spoke Russian poorly) Yartsev listed three Russian proposals. 
The first dealt with Finland's reluctance to sign a secret agreement with the Soviet 
Union. With this in mind, Yartsev stated "Russia would be satisfied if it receives a written 
undertaking under which Finland stands prepared to ward off possible attacks and, to that end, 
to accept Russian military aid. ,,18 The second proposal from Moscow dealt with the 
controversial question of the Aland islands. Finland and Sweden had been planning to arm 
the islands in accordance to a League of Nations ruling. However, Russian concerns plagued 
their fortification, in the belief that they could be used to bar access to the Gulf of Finland. 
According to the proposal, Moscow "... can assent to the fortification of the Aland Islands 
if Russia is enabled to take part in their arming and if it is permitted to send its own observer 
to follow the work and subsequently to maintain surveillance over the use of the 
17Tanner The Winter War, 8
 
18Ibid, 9 Tanner's notes of the meeting.
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fortifications." 19 The identity and activities of the said observer would, Yartsev stated, be 
entirely secret. But the most shocking of the proposals was the third, where in return for 
withdrawing its objections for the Aland fortifications, the island of Suursaari (located 
approximately halfway between Leningrad and Helsinki) would become a fortified air and 
naval base for the Red Army. 
Finally, Tanner had something with which to approach his government. Even though 
a few of the phrasings were far from fathomable, such as the extent of "Russian military aid," 
it was clear that Russia's wishes were on the table for everyone to see. For here, in the lazy 
Scandinavian sun of the summer of '38, the seeds of war were sown. Russia's concerns about 
Hitler and eventual war with Germany were commonplace; Yartsev's words regarding 
Moscow's definition of security were far more revealing. Security, in the eyes of the men in 
Moscow, meant not waiting at the border for the Germans to arrive, but advancing to meet 
them. This statement is the most practical explanation of Soviet foreign policy in the late 
1930's. Non-aggression pacts would not do-- Russia needed something a little more 
dependable. She was trying to convert her neighbor into an ally. 
But Helsinki did not desire a change in policy, and to accept any such agreement with 
Russia would be contrary to the principles of Scandinavian neutrality that the Kallio 
government had been pursuing since their election. It was clear that the Soviet proposals 
were not menacing in tone, for they were not a threat but rather an offer of guardianship. But 
Holsti had spent his career as Foreign Minister trying to avoid becoming a satellite of any 
power, and a defensive agreement like the one Russia proposed would jeopardize Finland's 
complete neutrality, for Finland was now a member of the Scandinavian countries, and 
19Ibid, 8 
proudly so. Moreover, those Finns who knew of the talks underestimated the importance of 
Yartsev. Surely, they reasoned, if the topic was so important to Moscow, the approach would 
be through typical diplomatic channels. When finally Tanner approached Cajander with 
Yartsev's three proposals, the Prime Minister was again forced to explain to the Russian 
envoy the importance of Finland's place in the world: "The proposal tends to violate Finland's 
sovereignty and is in conflict with the policy of neutrality which Finland follows in common 
with the nations of Scandinavia.... ,,20 This was the fmal word of the Finnish government; 
but before Yartsev could press the matter further, the world's attention focused on the Sudeten 
Germans in Czechoslovakia. 
* * * 
Munich hosted one of the most decisive events of the century. France, Britain, Italy, 
and Germany dismembered an absent and agape Czechoslovakia, which allowed Hitler in: one 
stroke to undermine security in eastern Europe and rupture relations between the Soviet Union 
and the western democracies. On September 29, Isvestia reflected the views of the rejected 
and infuriated Politburo, asserting that Munich was not a "fight for Czechoslovakia, but a 
fight against German hegemony in Europe. 1121 The Soviet government interpreted the 
agreement as western conciliation aimed at excluding Russia from European affairs. 22 Russia 
2°Ibid, 10 
21Isvestia 29 September, 1938. 
22D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, (New York, Doubleday, 
1961), 83 
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was truly isolated; Litvinov's noble collective security policy collapsed revealing the 
hopelessness of containing Germany through western cooperation. 23 Soviet Foreign policy 
needed a change, but it would be March before the Munich reverberations would take solid 
form in Moscow. 
The shadow of Munich reached the shores of Helsinki as well. It was Finland's 
farsighted belief that war between the western powers would leave Russia supreme in Europe, 
and Finland would lie at the great bear's mercy, as the Helsingin Sanomat, claimed "a world 
conflagration would benefit only the Soviet Union which would be able to spread the misery 
of Bolshevism across Europe. ,,24 To Finns, saving Czechoslovakia would have meant 
sacrificing Finnish security. The agreement reached, therefore, was necessary for world peace 
as well as Finnish security, albeit contrary to democratic ideals.25 
Aside from a few trade talks conducted in Moscow in the early winter months, 
conversations between Finland and Russia ground to a halt after September. Rudolf Holsti 
resigned as Foreign Minister on November 16, and Eljas Erkko, publisher of the daily 
Helsingin Sanomat, assumed the role on 12 December. Erkko was known to have strong 
British and American ties and was an avid believer in the Munich agreement, as well as a 
strong belief in the power of Finnish neutrality manifested in territorial integrity. Holsti's 
resignation coincided with the unilateral banning of the IKL, Finland's openly fascist party. 
23Vladimir Potemkin "The Soviet View of Munich," (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 
1960) 
24Louis Schmier, Russia and Finland. (New York: Schmier, 1963),24 
25Germany, Foreign Offfice, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, 
(Weisbaden,1951), Series D, vol 6, 513-514 
Although the act was later denounced unconstitutional by the courts, it was an obvious 
attempt to balance Holsti's departure and the induction of Erkko. 
March of 1939 proved pivotal for the precarious political impasse in Russo-Finnish 
relations. On the tenth of the month, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began its 
eighteenth party congress in Moscow. Excitement was high--the great comrade Stalin himself 
planned to deliver a major address on the international situation. And when the time came, 
no one in the audience heard any internationalist phrases, such as "collective security" and a 
"common front of peace-loving nations. II No one there heard distinctions between the western 
capitalist powers, either; cooperation with other nations had proven fruitless, and the USSR 
was not going to be Europe's fireman. To Russia's neighbors he wished "... to maintain 
peaceful, close, and friendly relations so long as they refrain from threatening directly or 
indirectly the integrity and inviolability of our frontier. 1126 And Stalin, rasping through his 
second language on a podium of power fit for a god, also hinted that there were no 
insurmountable obstacles to a better Russo-German understanding. Whatever the case, the 
Soviet Union was not going to entangle itself in the squabbles of the western imperialist 
powers. 
Stalin's speech to the Eighteenth Party Congress also marked a new series of bilateral 
talks, including, of course, one with Finland. Yrjo-Koskinen, the Finnish envoy in Moscow, 
received a memorandum from Litvinov early in March requesting the lease of the Islands of 
Suursaari, Lavansaari, and Seisaari to the Soviet Union for thirty years. Finland flatly refused 
the request, even when the Russians promised to keep them demilitarized. It was not a matter 
26Jane Degras, ed. Soviet Documents of Foreign Affairs. 1933-1941 (New York: Harcourt 
and Brace, 1948-53), vol. 3, 320 
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of demilitarization, the Finns believed, but a matter of the continually stressed policy of 
territorial integrity. An annoyed Litivinov played his last trump: in exchange for the islands, 
he offered 150 square miles of territory in east Russian Karelia. This too was refused. 27 
Even though these few ideas put forth by the Soviet Union in March of 1939 were not 
taken seriously by the majority of the Finnish cabinet and decisions to refuse the offers were 
nearly unanimous, one dissenting voice broke the solidity of the government. Marshall Carl 
Gustaf Mannerheim, Chairman of the Council of Defense and long time hero of the Finnish 
Republic, did not share the views of the liberal majority of the cabinet. Whereas President 
Kallio, Foreign Minister Erkko, and Prime Minister Cajander argued that there were no 
guarantees that the first Russian request might lead to further demands for leases on the 
mainland, the aging Marshall advised immediate acceptance in order to allay Soviet 
SuspICIOns. He stated: 
...the islands were of no real use to the country and with their neutralized 
condition, we had not the chance of defending them ... For the Russians, on the other 
hand, they were of practical significance because they guarded the entrance to their 
marine base in Luga Bay. We should therefore use the few trumps we hold. 28 
Not only did he support the cession of the islands in question, but he also suggested a 
readj ustment of the Karelian frontier a few kilometers westward (but not far enough to 
compromise Finnish fortifications) as a gesture of goodwill to the Soviets. But the majority 
was not swayed, and Finnish silence once again frustrated hopes for a settlement. 
Throughout the summer of 1939, it occurred to the Finns just how difficult it was to 
maintain freedom in the political maelstrom of the late 1930's. Big-Power diplomacy had 
27Tanner, The Winter War, 13-15 
28Carl Mannerheim, Memoirs, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 30-31 
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dismembered Czechoslovakia and the other small states of eastern Europe feared their tum. 
The Finnish government categorically refused offers for a German non-aggression Pact in 
June, bellowing loudly the same pretexts the Soviets had heard for the past twelve months. 29 
But when Anglo-French-Soviet talks began in Moscow in the summer, it was Finland's tum to 
be discussed behind closed doors. 
The cabinet feared the worst. While the French, British, and Russians debated the fate 
of eastern Europe in the event of a war with Germany, the Finnish government informed the 
British that: 
The Finnish government cannot admit the right of any Power to come to their 
assistance for the purpose of resisting an alleged direct or "indirect" aggression on 
Finland, in any other cases than when they themselves have called for such 
assistance. 30 
By no means were the Finns to have their destiny preplanned for them. 
For over a year the Soviet Union had tried to bargain with Finland. The Kremlin's 
first attempt at an agreement failed with Boris Yartsev's return to Russia. After the Munich 
conference and the subsequent shift in Russian foreign policy, the men in Moscow tried a 
more direct approach. This, too, failed. Talks between Britain, France, and the Kremlin 
came to naught; neither Poland, Rumania, nor Finland would allow access to the Red Army in 
order to counter any German threat. Historians still debate when the idea of German-Russian 
cooperation came into being, and they will continue to do so until the Pandora's Red box is 
opened. But one thing is clear: after the snub at Munich and the impasses at Moscow in the 
summer of 1939, Stalin realized the futility of cooperation with the western democracies. 
29Germany, D.G.F.P. 1918-1945 Series D vol 6 ,525-527 
30Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 
(London, 1952-54), Series III vol 6, 308 
-And since working with the west had proven fruitless, perhaps Germany had something to 
offer. 
The infamous Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, shocked the world. In Finland, 
reactions were mixed. Many believed that since Finnish policy strived to avoid close ties 
with either Germany, Hitler's declaration of disinterest was exactly what the government 
wished.3! However, more observant Finns, including Marshall Mannerheim, foresaw doom, 
for they knew that Finnish security rested upon the balance of power in the Baltic. Historian 
Henry Wolfe quoted one Finn who summed up the position of all states sandwiched between 
Germany and Russia: 
We ... are like bones laying between two fierce, hungry dogs. As long as 
they are snarling at each other, we bones are relatively safe. Neither dog will allow 
the other to grab us ... what we fear most of all is the possibility that the dogs may 
become friends. In this case they would divide the bones between them. 32 
The Nazi-Soviet Pact ended all hope for Finland. Although the Finnish Government was 
technically unaware of the secret protocol signed by Ribbentrop and Russia's new Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, it soon became apparent that indeed Germany and Russia had 
divided the bones between them. 
* * * 
Few dates imbed themselves on the minds of men like September 1, 1939. Germany's 
assault on Poland was unprovoked and swift. Soon France and Britain declared their second 
31Tanner, The Winter War, 19 
32Henry C. Wolfe, "Stalin in Europe: the Baltic," Current History Nov 1939 vol.S,19 
state of war with Germany in twenty-five years. This time, however, no crowds lined the 
streets; no parades celebrated the declarations. All was dark in Europe. 
Finland immediately declared its neutrality.33 The Kremlin, however, remained silent 
until the rumble of tanks and infantry enveloped eastern Poland, followed soon after by 
Stalin's diplomatic envelopment of the Baltic states. Molotov summoned Estonian Foreign 
Minister Kart Seller to Moscow on September 22; when he returned five days later, Estonia 
had to accept its fate. The Red Navy occupied Estonia's harbors, the Red Army guarded their 
cities, and the Red Air Force garrisoned their aerodromes.34 Latvia was next, followed by 
Lithuania. By October 11, the Kremlin had snuffed out all Baltic independence of action. 
Militarily cut off from the west and politically sold out by Germany, all three were now 
Soviet protectorates. 
The next move was obvious to the Finns, who could only wait for the inevitable. 
From Boris Yartsev's telephone call to the developments in March, never did the Finns truly 
realize the glaring fragility of their situation. Perhaps one could call it idealist or foolish; but 
the Finns never thought it would come to this. In an agreement between Russia and 
Germany, Finland must have been mentioned. Attempts in Berlin to ascertain Finland's fate 
failed, though, for German diplomats left Finland uninformed.35 Nevertheless, the policy of 
aloof neutrality was upheld in diplomatic circles as Finland's last and only hope to avoid 
Russian domination. 
33Finland, Blue Book. 38 
34Schmier, Russia and Finland, 32 
35Germany, D.G.F.P. Series D vol. 8, 199 
On October 5, Molotov handed Yrjo-Koskinen a note suggesting that Finland send a 
delegation to Moscow within three days in order to discuss "concrete political questions 
which have become urgent through the outbreak of war."36 Now was not the time for 
whispered conversations between a few officials; there was steel in Molotov's note. This was 
the challenge which had been expected; an invitation to question Finland's neutrality, her 
Scandinavian status, her sovereignty, and her soul.3? But even though Finland's position was 
nothing to envy, several signs indicated that the Finns would not capitulate so quickly. The 
time limit set by Moscow -- forty eight hours -- was simply ignored. An astonished Molotov 
viewed this as an act of defiance, warning the Finnish government to hasten with a reply or 
Russia would have to resort to drastic means. In Helsinki, the Soviet envoy burst into 
Erkko's office crying outrage. 38 
But the most blatant move of defiance on the part of the Finnish Government was 
their decision to send someone other than Foreign Minister Eljas Erkko on the gloomy train 
of despair to Moscow. "The place for a foreign Minister is with his government," Erkko' 
stated, in order to advise the President and partake in the crucial decisions of the cabinet. 39 
The lucky man chosen to share a table with Stalin and Molotov was none other than Juho 
Kusti Paasikivi, the same man who nineteen years earlier represented Finland in the 
negotiations at Dorpat. According to Max Jakobson, "the choice was one of the rare 
36Finland, Blue Book, 42-43 
37Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 106 
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intuitive, or perhaps accidental, strokes of genius that may change a nation's history.,,4o 
Paasikivi, at the time, held the influential position of Finnish Minister in Stockholm. His 
Russian was excellent; his will powerful. At the age of sixty nine years, Paasikivi witnessed 
his career blossom from Minister in Stockholm before the conflict to Prime Minister in 1944. 
Juho Paasikivi came to mean to Finland what Churchill did to Great Britain, the difference 
being that his task was not winning the war but winning the peace after the war had been 
lost. Finland was truly preparing for negotiations, not for some mere ceremony of 
subservience. 
As the delegation hastily readied itself for departure on October 9, the Finnish cabinet 
instructed Paasikivi in the position of the government. In the event discussions concerning 
the frontier near Leningrad should arise, he was to refer to the treaty of Dorpat. He was told 
to uphold the idea of neutrality, for Finland was not about to compromise its independence. 
Any requests for a mutual assistance pact should be declined, no matter what the proposal. 
As an extreme concession, discussion of the islands in the Gulf of Finland would be 
permissible with the notable exception of Suursaari.41 
No organization urged the people to flock to the railroad stations; no official called for 
a surge in patriotism. In fact, the government consistently played down the importance of the 
delegation's mission. In order to clarify Finland's role in the upcoming talks, Erkko stated, 
"Finland will not sign a dictated agreement incompatible with her independence, her integrity, 
4°Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War, 107 
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and her neutrality, ,,42 Nevertheless, cheering crowds gathered at station after station along the 
route, as if every Finn knew deep in their souls the true implication of the invitation. 
While Paasikivi and his retinue sped towards Moscow, Marshall Mannerheim began to 
prepare Finland for the worst. The army ordered certain border towns evacuated and called 
up several classes of reserves. Frontier troops on high alert status manned the fortifications; it 
wasn't long before a full 250,000 troops reached readiness. Although the government 
announced no cause for apprehension, the military attempted the first complete blackouts of 
Viipuri and Helsinki. On October 13, more reservists entered active duty. Military men 
commandeered hundreds of cars and trucks, erected barracks, and piled sandbags next to 
buildings.43 President Kallio soon signed a bill that required national service from all 
civilians. 44 The evacuations on the border continued. 
But while all was bustling in Finland, in a quiet room behind the world-stopping walls 
of the Kremlin, the talks began. It had been nineteen years since these men had met. At 
Dorpat, Paasikivi sat across from the Commissar for Nationalities of the fledgling Soviet· 
Republic, a man who had risen to be one of the most powerful men in the world. For 
Russia's representative at Dorpat was none other than Josef Djugashvili -- Stalin. Little did 
they know that on a rainy, grey Moscow day in 1939, they would meet again. 
Negotiations commenced in earnest when Stalin and Molotov proposed a treaty of 
mutual assistance similar to those concluded with the Baltic States. Paasikivi at once rejected 
42"Foreign Minister of Finland in Statement Says Nation Will Reject Any 'Dictated' Pact." 
New York Times 12 October, 1939 p. 4 col. 1 
43Mannerheim, Memoirs, 309 
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the proposal, maintaining the view that such an alliance with the Soviet Union was a prelude 
to invasion, occupation, and annexation. Molotov then stressed the need for security in the 
Gulf of Finland since the war had broken out. Talks continued, with a second proposal for an 
alliance rejected as wel1. 45 
Two days later, on October 14, a frustrated Stalin presented a list of minimum 
demands. He suggested a new frontier between the two nations in the area of Leningrad, one 
about fifteen miles behind the current border. All fortifications there would be dismantled. 
The Red Army and Navy would also man a military installation on the peninsula of Hanko, 
near Turku. He also requested control over the islands of Suursaari, Lavansaari, Tytarsaari, 
and Koivisto, and regions in the far arctic north around the Rybachi peninsula. In 
compensation, the Soviet Union would cede Finland certain territory along the border of 
eastern Karelia. In reference to the reasoning behind these minimum demands, Stalin told the 
Finns, "We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the border should be 70 kilometers. As 
to [Koivisto] you must bear in mind that if 16-inch guns were placed there, the movement of 
our fleet could be entirely paralyzed in the far end of the Gulf. ,,46 It became clear to the 
Finns that even though the Russians shared a military pact with Germany, it was Germany 
they truly feared. 47 Outside expansion in an endangered zone was a necessary facet of pre­
war maneuvering. If the war ended in the west and Russia was forced to fight Germany for 
whatever reason, the Soviet Union had to be militarily and politically insured. The Russian 
45David Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1942) 119 
46Wourinen, Finland in World War Two, 53 
47Tanner, The Winter War, 41 
policy of "rushing to meet the enemy" had not changed because of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, for 
the Kremlin had always chosen territorial acquisition over military alliances.48 
However, Finnish opinions differed. Finland knew that ties with Germany were at this 
time nonexistent, and Russian talk of Leningrad security requirements masked real intentions 
of expansion. Because of Finland's isolated position, most Finns agreed that no Great Power 
could use Finland as a base of attack against Russia. A plan of this sort would require so 
much time that Russia would have ample opportunities to repel such an assault whether they 
owned military complexes in Finland or not. 49 
In light of these two dominant, contrasting misunderstandings -- the Russians on one 
hand fearing the German use of Finland as a base of operations against Leningrad and the 
Finns on the other claiming an ulterior motive to the Soviet Union's advances, it is not 
surprising that the talks in Moscow would be inconclusive if the two sides would not give in. 
The absence of any strong military ties with any nation allowed Finland to be isolated. 
Germany's gift to Russia in August further drowned Finland in waters of impending doom. 
With all of this fresh in his mind, Paasikivi told Stalin that the Russian demands went 
far beyond the delegation's authorization and that he would have to return to Helsinki for 
consultation with the cabinet. Stalin did not object, but he did point a finger at the 
mobilization efforts in Finland. He calmly mentioned that Russian troops were mobilizing as 
well, and as Paasikivi took his leave, Stalin ominously warned, "This cannot go on for long 
without danger of accidents. ,,50 
48Schmier, Russia and Finland, 45 
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* * * 
The Finnish cabinet immediately discussed the Russian demands as soon as Paasikivi 
stepped off the train. Military experts also participated, at the request of Marshall 
Mannerheim. Eventually, the wise words of the aged Marshall penetrated the idealistic skulls 
of the civilian members of the cabinet. In the end, the government drew up a reply to the 
demands, which was in fact a significant retreat from its original adamant position. In 
principle, the cabinet decided to agree with Stalin's argument that Russia had legitimate 
defense needs along the various approaches to Leningrad which Finland was obliged to fulfill. 
The issue, then, was what constituted legitimate Soviet security needs. A modest revision of 
the border on the Karelian isthmus was acceptable, and the government also offered the 
islands of Suikari, Tytasaari, Peninsaari, Lavansaari, as well as the southern half of Suursaari 
and the northern half of the Rybachi peninsula. 51 However, one point in particular perturbed 
the politicians: the peninsula of Hanko. Even Mannerheim, who proposed more concessions 
to the Soviet Union than the cabinet agreed, stressed that if indeed the Russians owned a 
military installation deep within the borders of Finland it would greatly endanger not only the 
defense of the Republic but the ideal of independence of action. In effect, a Russian outpost 
on Hanko would ensure Russian domination of Finnish affairs. In the end, the cabinet 
ordered Paasikivi not to discuss the leasing or ceding of Hanko. 52 Accompanied by Vaino 
Tanner to represent the cabinet, Paasikivi left for Moscow on October 21. 
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confirmed the massing of Red Army men and materiel on the border, and Russian flights over 
As the train sped to Moscow, Mannerheim continued his preparations. Reports 
Finland occurred daily in Karelia and the area near Petsamo. The situation looked grave to 
the Marshall; so in order to avoid any unfortunate incidents, he ordered all Finnish artillery 
out of range of the frontier, and he instructed border garrisons to avoid any activities which 
might serve as an excuse for Soviet provocation. 53 
Stalin read the Finnish reply on October 23. Unfortunately, the Finns based their 
diplomacy on the assumption that Stalin's first demands were so high enough as to leave 
room for bargaining. Stalin and his henchmen, however, did not diplomacize as per the old 
school rules of bargaining; minimum demands meant no space for bargaining at all. 54 As he 
perused the delegation's reply, he calmly declared the counterproposals completely 
insufficient; the Karelian border must be shifted to the village of Koivisto, not only eight 
miles as the Finns suggested. In addition, Stalin once again raised the question of the Hanko 
peninsula. 55 
After sharing a knowing glance, Tanner and Paasikivi prepared to leave; apparently the 
negotiations could continue no further. Molotov remained in his seat. "Is it your intention to 
provoke a conflict?" he asked, to which Paasikivi replied, "We want no such thing, but you 
seem to. ,,56 The door closed shut. 
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The negotiations had reached their final, crucial stage. Both sides refused to alter their 
current stance, but neither wished to initiate a final break. The two sides had forged a 
deadlock of steel in their policies. In the end, both parties agreed to wait until the Finnish 
delegates once again consulted Helsinki. 
The cabinet was in chaos. But by now Paasikivi no longer felt that Stalin was 
bluffing; one more rejection of his demands could mean war. 
What is the use of neutrality and Scandinavian cooperation? Our geographical 
position ties us to Russia. Now we must choose between a war that might tum 
Finland into a Bolshevik state, and submitting to life within the Soviet sphere 
of influence... "57 
Paasikivi feared the worst; he argued for the acceptance of a Soviet base at Hanko, though he 
hoped Stalin would accept a nearby island instead of a mainland installation. 
Vaina Tanner agreed that Hanko represented the sore on the foot of the talks. To 
reject the Soviet demand for Hanko would certainly mean war. He believed that Finland 
could do without the islands in question, and without portions of the Petsamo area as well, 
save Petsamo itself. The Karelian border, Tanner argued, should be adjusted, but even though 
he believed that war could result, he stressed that if Finland abandoned Hanko, then Finland 
would abandon her independence. 58 
Eljas Erkko similarly believed that the surrender of Hanko would signify a humiliating 
defeat. If the Russians had access to Hanko, he argued, it would imply the use of the entire 
railroad complex of southern Finland, thereby allowing the Russians access to the entire 
country. Erkko, however correct he might have been regarding this statement, certainly did 
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not understand Stalin or Russia as a whole. He refused to heed the words of those elder 
Finns who had personally dealt with Russia and Russians before, namely Mannerheim and 
Paasikivi. The Foreign Minister proceeded to believe that if Finland took a firm stand in the 
negotiations, the Russians would ease their demands. As the delegation left for the third and 
last time on October 31, Erkko handed Tanner a note. His words occupied Tanner's thoughts 
on the train to Moscow: "The Russians do not want a conflict. Nor will they risk a fiasco 
before the eyes of the world ... ,,59 He could not have been more wrong, for the Russians did 
both. 
The Kremlin did not remain silent during the lapse in the negotiations. The very day 
the Finnish delegation left for Moscow, Molotov presented the matter before the Supreme 
Soviet in a public address. He emphasized the need for security in Leningrad, and warned of 
great harm if a treaty could not be concluded. The Soviet Union, he claimed, had "not only 
the right, but the duty... to adopt serious measures for strengthening its security.,,60 With 
this speech, Molotov placed the prestige of the Soviet Union on the line. It was a strategic 
maneuver to warn Finland, for with this move the Russians had cut off all avenues for 
discussion. 61 
Back in Helsinki, the optimistic Erkko made a public reply. The crowd roared when 
he spoke of defending basic values, of no surrender of Finnish territory for Russian military 
bases. And as he concluded, he stressed the fundamental attitude behind the Finnish 
59Tanner, The Winter War, 57 
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delegation: the suspicion that acceptance of proposals today would destroy Finland's ability to 
resist the demands that were bound to follow tomorrow.62 
The third round of negotiations deadlocked from the start. Hanko again formed the 
root of the problem. After an hour's discussion, Molotov cryptically mumbled, "It is apparent 
that we civilians don't seem to be making progress; now it is up to the military to have their 
way.,,63 Never had his words come closer to a threat during the talks. 
On November 4, the talks reached a climax. Stalin summoned the Finns and offered 
to relinquish his claims on the peninsula of Hanko in exchange for the nearby islands of Koo, 
Hermanso, and Hasto-Buso. The gracious comrade Stalin then informed the Finns that they 
needed the protection of "larger powers," and he added, "look what happened to Poland."64 
Tanner and Paasikivi were astonished. Here, finally, was the possibility of 
compromise. Stalin anxiously awaited an agreement and the Finns now felt it; the price could 
go no lower. Paasikivi radioed Erkko and urged him to accept the offer. Erkko and the ' 
cabinet, however, mistakenly believed that Stalin's withdrawal from his original demands 
meant that the Foreign Minister was right all along. Now was the time to stand firm and 
resist the Russian demand for any bases on Finnish soil. The exact location of the base 
meant little; a Soviet installation in Finland was a threat to Finnish independence. 
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Paasikivi was furious. He remarked to Colonel Paasonen, "None of the...people but 
Mannerheim understands anything.,,65 The aged emissary knew that the time had come; 
neither the younger members of cabinet nor the Russians would go no further. In fact, they 
were headed in opposite directions. When Paasikivi asked Erkko if he should call an end to 
the talks if no agreement could be reached, Erkko replied, "If no agreement [is reached] on 
the basis proposed, you are free to break of the negotiations."66 
Tanner and Paasikivi met with Stalin again on the ninth of November. Tanner handed 
him Helsinki's final answer: "Finland cannot grant a foreign power military bases either on its 
territory or within its borders. ,,67 All present soon realized another deadlock was at hand and 
the men cordially disbanded. It lasted less than an hour. On November 13, the silence of the 
Kremlin convinced Helsinki to recall its envoys. The mission to Moscow, as well as the 
negotiations as a whole, had ended. 
* * * 
It wasn't long until the Kremlin initiated action of an alternative sort. On November 
26, several artillery shots decimated a Red Army bunker near the border village of Mainila. 
Finland vehemently denied the accusations that streamed from a volatile Molotov. By the end 
of the month the Red Army poured into Finland; the rest is history. 
65Tanner, The Winter War, 75 
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Whether or not the Winter War could have been avoided is a matter wholly dependent 
upon the reader's fancy for the unreal. The facts show that from the treaty of Dorpat to the 
Munich agreement and the subsequent change in Russian foreign outlook, the policy of the 
Soviet Union towards Finland was not hostile in any way. Boris Yartsev's attempt at an 
understanding in 1938 ultimately failed due to the strict policy of neutral aloofness that the 
idealistic Finnish government followed. After the hardening of diplomacy in March of 1939, 
Russian attempts at leasing key islands, islands which Mannerheim stressed were useless to 
Finland but valuable to Russia, failed as well for the same reasons. Elder statesmen who 
comprehended the reality of the political maelstrom of the 1930's and the reality of the Soviet 
Union always advocated concessions to the mighty, merciless neighbor. But for some reason, 
politicians of the younger generation, the Versailles generation, were much more inclined to 
foolishly believe that Russia is a power who believed in faith, trust, and respect. A quick 
glance at a map of the Second World War reveals the unfortunate fate of many a "neutral" 
state, including three Scandinavian countries, who disbelieved their own importance in the 
eyes of their neighbors. 
Certainly, as the facts have shown, the Nazi-Soviet Pact sealed Finland's fate. Lodged 
in the Soviet sphere of influence, the Finns should have realized that they had to deal with 
their neighbor or face an uncertain fate. Even though it is this author's belief that the Winter 
War proved the pride, prowess, and solidarity of Finland as a nation, many Finns suffered and 
died. Twelve per cent of the population, which includes Viipuri, Finland's second largest city, 
fell into the hands of a teriible power. 
•
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Could Finland have bargained to save themselves from a war? The facts initially spell 
out affirmatively. but no one can guess what would have happened next, especially since the 
folowing May, as Hitler's Panzer divisions danced across France, the USSR swallowed the 
Baltic states whole. But would this, too, have happened to Finland if they had given in to 
Soviet demands? No one can answer this without adding heaping portions of speculation to 
the recipes of research. 
Some day, intrepid researchers will crack the portals to key archives. Perhaps their 
efforts will reveal new insights or new information as to the origins and consequences of the 
Winter War. Or perhaps they will raise new questions for further study. 
• 
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